This paper studies how cartel stability is in ‡uenced by asymmetric information and communication about demand. Firms in a cartel face ‡uctuating demand in a repeated game framework. In each period, one randomly chosen …rm knows current demand. In this context we consider two di¤erent equilibria -one where the informed …rm communicates its information to its partners and another where it does not. We argue that cartels are extremely unstable when the informed …rm communicates with the uninformed …rms. However, when the informed …rm does not communicate with the uninformed …rms, cartels can be as stable as when there are no demand ‡uctuations at all. Thus, if communication is needed to coordinate a cartel, this need may signi…cantly increase cartel instability.
Introduction
In markets not subject to random shocks, collusion turns out to be very easy for cartels to maintain (see, e.g., Table 2 below). 1 It therefore seems that random shocks, such as demand ‡uctuations, are necessary to model realistic levels of cartel instability (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986 ). However, if information about such ‡uctuations is symmetric, cartels still turn out to be stable, unless these ‡uctuations are very large (again see Table 2 below). Thus, some additional challenges to coordination, such as asymmetric information, may be necessary to model plausible levels of cartel instability.
It is natural to suppose that coordination in the face of such asymmetric information would be facilitated by communication. But is it? In this paper we explore the role of communication in facilitating collusion when there is asymmetric information about demand. We model an in…nitely repeated Cournot game with n …rms and asymmetric information about market conditions. Demand ‡uctuates randomly from period to period. In each period one …rm, chosen randomly, knows more about the state of demand than the others. The …rms must then decide whether or not they should communicate to coordinate production decisions.
We …rst consider an equilibrium where the informed …rm communicates with the uninformed …rms through a trade association, say (Vives 1990 ). 2 The objective of this communication is to let uninformed …rms know the current state 1 Collusion is even relatively easy in …nite horizon games (see, e.g. Conlon, 1996 Conlon, , 2002 . 2 This is consistent with Hay and Kelley (1974) and Fraas and Greer (1977) , who …nd that collusion is often facilitated by information exchange, through a trade association, or some other channel (see e.g. Hay and Kelley p. 21).
of demand, so the …rms can divide up the market evenly each period. In this situation we show that asymmetric information signi…cantly ampli…es the e¤ect of demand ‡uctuations in increasing cartel instability since, in high-demand states, the informed …rm can lie as well as cheat. 3 Next we consider an equilibrium where the informed …rm does not communicate with the other …rms. In this case, since the informed …rm can no longer lie to the uninformed …rms, cartels become more stable. In fact, cartels turn out to be not only as stable as when there is no asymmetric information, they actually become as stable as when there are no demand ‡uctuations at all! Thus, information asymmetry may reduce cartel stability if …rms communicate, but may actually cancel out the e¤ects of demand ‡uctuations themselves if …rms do not communicate. Intuitively, if there is no communication then, when the informed …rm is most tempted to cheat -i.e. when demand is high -its own output is high enough to cancel out its higher temptation to cheat.
Note, however, that in this paper communication is not actually necessary for the cartel to achieve e¢ ciency, since the informed …rm can adjust its own output to maximize cartel pro…ts. It therefore raises the question of other environments environments where communication is more important. For example, suppose more than one …rm is informed. Then setting aside the issue of playing these …rms against each other (see footnote 11 below), communication may be necessary to allow informed …rms to coordinate with each other to maximize cartel pro…ts. The results of this paper then suggest that such information structures may make cartels more unstable.
This paper contributes to a small but growing literature on the challenges faced by cartels which use communication to help them coordinate a collusive agreement in the face of asymmetric information. Major previous results in this literature include folk theorems in general repeated games with communication (Compte, 1998, Kandori and Matsushima, 1998 ; see also Mailath and Samuelson, 2006 , and the symposium on repeated games with asymmetric information in the January 2002 issue of the Journal of Econometric Theory).
However, folk theorems focus on agents whose discount factors approach one.
They therefore do not allow us to study the e¤ect of asymmetric information on collusion between …rms which are very patient, but whose discount factors are bounded away from one. Folk theorems are therefore an important, but blunt, instrument for measuring the e¤ects of asymmetric information on cartel instability.
Papers focusing on repeated game collusion between asymmetrically in- ing their own prices. Thus, communication is not used to adjust production to ‡uctuations in demand, but only to help distinguish random demand ‡uctua-tions from shifts due to cheating by collusive partners. In Athey and Bagwell (2001) , communication helps cartel members coordinate their responses to cost ‡uctuations observed before choosing prices, so production can be allocated to low cost …rms. Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) also focus on cost ‡uctu-ations, though they brie ‡y consider publicly observed demand ‡uctuations as well. In addition, this later paper does not allow communication. Hanazono and Yang (2007) resembles the current paper by considering asymmetric information about demand ‡uctuations. However, they again do not allow …rms to communicate. Their goal is to show that, if information about demand is inaccurate, it is optimal for colluding …rms to ignore this information all together.
Thus, none of these papers consider the possibility that the act of communication itself may be crucial to cartel stability or instability.
As far as we know, the …rst paper to seriously question the value of communication in facilitating collusive agreements is Heiko Gerlach's (2009) important paper on partial communication and collusion. In his main model, Gerlach considers a repeated Bertrand game in which demand is either high or low, and …rms may or may not receive information about this state. Remarkably, it turns out that communication of low-demand signals makes no contribution to pro…ts in the Gerlach model since, if either …rm receives a low-demand signal, the market will be served at the pro…t maximizing price regardless of whether or not the signal is communicated. Communication only in ‡uences the stochastic distribution of pro…ts between …rms. Our model builds on Gerlach's by considering Cournot, rather than Bertrand competition, and assuming a slightly di¤erent information structure. More importantly, we show that communication may not only be unnecessary, as in Gerlach (2009), but may in fact dramatically increase cartel instability.
Note also that the above papers focus primarily on the problem of hard-todetect "on schedule" deviations, in which one type of player simply pretends to be a di¤erent type of player. Thus, important pieces of a player's private information never become public in these models. While this assumption is plausible for the cost shocks considered by Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) , they may be less plausible for demand shocks.
In fact, the demand shocks considered by Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) are fully public. This paper, by contrast, focuses on coordination in the face of demand ‡uctu-ations where information is initially private but eventually becomes public. This allows us to focus on the implications of asymmetric information in a context where the only deviations cartel members must worry about are easier to detect "o¤ schedule" deviations. Thus we can avoid the technical di¢ culties involved in the imperfect private monitoring literature. In particular, this simpli…ca-tion allows us to measure the quantitative e¤ect of asymmetric information and communication on cartel instability among …rms with discount factors bounded away from one.
Note that the information sharing in this paper is di¤erent from that in, e.g., Vives (1984) and related papers. In that literature, information is veri…able, whereas we are assuming that information in our model is not veri…able until the next period. 4 Thus, the only reason why an informed …rm would tell the truth in our model is the hope of future cooperation. On the other hand, the possibility of lying enhances the incentive to cheat. Of course, in the equilibrium where …rms do not communicate, the issue of veri…ability is irrelevant.
There is an ongoing debate about the empirical plausibility of the RotembergSaloner framework, which is the starting point of our analysis. 5 Some of this debate concerns the behavior of cartels over the business cycle. However, this debate ignores the role of asymmetric information or communication in cartel stability, focusing instead on correlations between prices and business cycles.
Since our paper treats asymmetric information about demand ‡uctuations, and since …rms are likely to be equally informed about the macroeconomy, we are primarily concerned with individual market ‡uctuations uncorrelated with business cycles -for example, ‡uctuations forecast by individual …rms' marketing research departments (see, e.g., Vives, 1999 , and references therein for papers assuming asymmetric information about demand). Thus, the above debate regarding the Rotemberg and Saloner framework may not be particularly relevant for our paper. 6 Section 2 describes the basic game. It also examines the collusive trigger strategy equilibrium when the informed …rm communicates with the uninformed …rms, including the critical interest rate above which full collusion becomes impossible. Section 3 suggests that, when …rms communicate, asymmetric information may explain much more cartel instability than demand ‡uctuations alone. Numerical simulations also suggest that this e¤ect can be quite dramatic. Section 4 looks at the game described in Section 2, but modi…es the trigger strategy by assuming that …rms no longer communicate. We show there that, if …rms do not communicate, then cartels become as stable as when there are no demand ‡uctuations at all. 7 Section 5 concludes.
Before proceeding, we should emphasize that, to facilitate computation we make very speci…c assumptions about functional forms -speci…cally linear demand and total cost curves, and a two-point distribution of the demand shock. This is consistent with our goal of computing ball-park estimates of the quantitative e¤ects of asymmetric information and communication. However, it should be noted that our most striking result -that in the absence of communication cartels are as stable as if there are no demand ‡uctuations at all -will not hold exactly in more general settings. It should, however, still be approximately 6 Note also that the no-communication equilibrium in our model behaves very di¤erent from the equilibria in the Rotemberg-Saloner model, since, in this equilibrium, collusion does NOT break down in the high-demand state. The above empirical literature therefore does not cast light directly on our model, even setting aside the issue of cyclical versus noncyclical ‡uctuations. 7 The presence of an informed …rm gives the model elements of a signaling game. However, the informed …rm only sees one of the two possibilities of high versus low demand. Thus, the informed …rm's only pure-strategy signals are either to report the true state accurately or to remain silent, and both possibilities are considered in this paper. Mixed strategies are also a possibility, though it's not clear why such mixed strategies would be useful to …rms in the current environment. Nevertheless, it may be interesting in future work to study environments where richer signaling strategies are relevant.
true. Future work should investigate how sensitive this result is to the exact functional forms we consider. Indeed, it would be very interesting if, for some functional forms, asymmetric information, without communication, turned out to make cartels more stable than the no- ‡uctuations case!
Collusion When Firms Communicate
Consider an in…nitely repeated n-…rm Cournot oligopoly, where market demand is either high or low, with demand ‡uctuating independently across periods. Let the inverse market demand function be
where a is a random variable. In the high-demand state the intercept term is a H and in the low-demand state the intercept term is a L , with a H > a L . The demand curves are linear for simplicity. All …rms know that the probability of high demand is and the probability of low demand is 1
. In each period one …rm is informed about a and n 1 …rms are uninformed. However, all …rms know the parameter values a H and a L , though uninformed …rms do not know the current state of demand. The identity of the informed …rm ‡uctuates independently from period to period, with each …rm equally likely to be chosen as that period's informed …rm. The informed …rm learns current demand but not future demand. The other n 1 …rms know the identity of the current informed …rm, but do not know current or future demand. 8 As part of a collusive agree-ment, the …rm that happens to be informed in a period may convey information about the state of demand to the other …rms. However, the informed …rm may also lie to the other …rms. Nevertheless, all …rms learn previous demand, so any lying by the informed …rm can be detected with a one period lag.
Next, to reduce notation, assume that production of the good is costless.
With constant marginal cost c, we could replace a H with a H c and a L with a L c in the equations below. Finally, assume that all …rms discount using the discount factor 1=(1 + r), where r is the interest rate. share of the implied monopoly output. 9 The …rms then divide the monopoly output equally among themselves. If any …rm deviates in any period, all …rms revert to the non-cooperative one-shot equilibrium for all periods thereafter.
The question is then, for what values of r is the strategy pro…le an equilibrium.
We will then argue that the cartel is unstable if the strategy pro…le is only an equilibrium when …rms are very patient, i.e. when r is low (see footnote 3).
Section 2.1 below determines the expected per-period payo¤ to each of the …rms if they collude. The expected payo¤s during the non-cooperative punishment phase are derived in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 derives the one-period payo¤ to the informed …rm given that it lies and cheats on the collusive agreement at the expense of the others when demand is high. Section 2.4 derives the discounted expected payo¤ to each …rm over time and the critical interest rate above which full collusion is not possible.
Expected Payo¤s Per Period if the Firms Collude
If the …rms collude, the informed …rm in each period tells the uninformed …rms the state of demand and together they divide the monopoly output and pro…ts equally among themselves. Thus, each …rm produces a H =2n in the high demand state and a L =2n in the low demand state, so the payo¤ to each …rm is a 
where the superscript COLL stands for "collusive".
Strategies and Expected Per Period Payo¤s in the Punishment Phase
If any …rm deviates from the collusive agreement the industry reverts to a permanent non-cooperative phase. 10 In the punishment phase the …rms do not communicate since the uninformed …rms no longer trust the informed …rms.
Thus, uninformed …rms do not know demand in a particular period, though they do know the probability of high or low demand in any period. This yields 1 0 Note that we do not use optimal punishment strategies of the sort discussed in Abreu (1986) or Abreu, Pierce, and Stachetti (1986). It would be interesting to extend the analysis of optimal punishment strategies to environments such as this one, with asymmetric information about game payo¤ functions. However, this would add considerable complexity to our analysis. Also, it would probably not change the qualitative results much. When …rms communicate, our results are driven by the increased temptation to cheat in situations where the cheater can also lie about the state of the world, and this e¤ect would remain. When …rms do not communicate, our results are driven by the fact that under collusion, the informed …rm meets all of the additional demand in high-demand states so its temptation to cheat is drastically reduced. In this case too, it should not matter much whether punishment is optimal or not. Note that Athey and Bagwell (2001) assume Nash reversion punishments in their numerical examples. Aoyagi (2002) also assumes Nash reversion punishment strategies. Of course, with a Bertrand stage game (as opposed to the Cournot stage game assumed here), Nash reversion often is the optimal punishment strategy.
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in each period. 11 In this equilibrium the quantity produced by each uninformed …rm is given by
where the superscript NC stands for "noncooperative," and U stands for "uninformed." This output is independent of whether demand is high or low, since uninformed …rms do not know the state of demand.
When demand is high the informed …rm produces
where the superscript I stands for "informed."Finally, when demand is low the informed …rm produces
shows that the market price in the punishment phase with high demand is p H = q . The expected payo¤ to an uninformed …rm in a given period of the punishment phase is therefore given by
and the expected pro…t to a …rm if it is informed is given by
Now, in any period, there is a 1=n chance of a …rm being informed and an (n 1)=n chance of it being uninformed (see footnote 8). Therefore, the ex ante expected payo¤ to the …rm in the punishment phase, before it knows whether it is informed, is given by
A Lying Cheating Informed Firm
In each period that the collusive agreement is supposed to be in place (including the one in which cheating occurs), the informed …rm makes a statement to the uninformed …rms about the state of the market. The informed …rm may tell the truth or lie, but the uninformed …rms believe the informed …rm unless the agreement has been broken previously (see footnote 9).
With low demand, the informed …rm has no incentive to lie, and so less incentive to cheat. We therefore focus on the high demand situation. If demand is high, but the informed …rm cheats, it will also tell the other …rms that demand is low. Thus, the uninformed …rms produce their share of the low demand monopoly output. This is a L =2n per …rm, or (n 1)a L =2n in the aggregate.
The informed …rm's problem is to maximize pro…ts given this output of the uninformed …rms. Thus, the cheating informed …rm produces
where CH stands for "cheating." The payo¤ to the cheating informed …rm is then given by
Of course, the uninformed …rms can cheat too. However, since they cannot lie or take advantage of high demand, their temptation to cheat is lower than the informed …rm's. Thus they do not a¤ect the critical point at which collusion becomes unstable.
The Decision to Cooperate and the Critical Interest
Rate.
We have modeled a situation where the informed …rm might lie and cheat on a collusive agreement. In the equilibrium we are considering, if a …rm cheats in one period, then, starting in the next period, all …rms forever enter a noncooperative phase. In this subsection we …nd the maximum (critical) interest rate consistent with a credible trigger strategy that maintains full collusion. In other words we calculate the rate of return on investment in collusion for an informed …rm in a high demand state.
Let r be the interest rate …rms use to calculate the present value of future pro…ts. Thus r measures the patience of a …rm in terms of its willingness to wait for future pro…ts. The higher the rate of interest, the less important is the future expected stream of collusive pro…ts and thus the greater the relative allure of cheating today.
The expected payo¤ to each …rm if collusion is maintained in this and all future periods, given that current demand is high, is
where COLL is de…ned in (1) . Expected present and future payo¤ to a lying, cheating, informed …rm, given that current demand is high, is
where CH;I H and N C are de…ned in (9) and (7) respectively. Thus, the informed …rm is willing to supply truthful information and cooperate if and only if
This inequality re ‡ects the fact that, for a trigger strategy to be credible, the expected present discounted payo¤ from colluding must be greater than or equal to that from cheating. It follows that full collusion is possible through this equilibrium if and only if
where COLL , N C , and
are de…ned in (1), (7) , and (9), respectively.
Proposition 1 yields a formula for the critical interest rate, r asym . The formal proof is in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1
The maximum interest rate consistent with the above trigger strategy, with asymmetric information and communication is
This is the maximum value of r that will allow our trigger strategy to be credible. In other words, r asym is the rate of return on full cooperation for the situation when cheating is most pro…table (i.e., when the cheating …rm is informed and demand is high). Any higher value of r will make cheating relatively more attractive by discounting the expected future pro…ts from collusion too much. This would weaken the threat of a trigger strategy. Thus, if r > r asym , the …rms cannot maintain the symmetric, joint-pro…t maximizing level of collusion. Note that setting a H = a L in Proposition 1 simpli…es (14) to r asym = r 0 = 4n=(n + 1) 2 . This, as expected, is the interest rate consistent with a credible trigger strategy if there are no demand ‡uctuations and consequently no information asymmetry.
3 The Quantitative E¤ects of Information Asymmetry on Cartel Stability Under Communication.
In our model there are two factors that lead to greater cartel instability. The …rst factor is randomly ‡uctuating demand (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) , and the second is the temptation to lie to take advantage of asymmetric information.
Together, these factors reduce the return to cooperation much more than do demand ‡uctuations alone, as shown in Proposition 2 and Tables 1 through 3 below. Proposition 2 focuses on the limiting case of small ‡uctuations. The numerical simulations in Table 1 illustrate this limiting case, while Tables 2 and   3 consider more general cases. The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2
As a H approaches a L , the fraction of the fall in r asym attributable to asymmetric information approaches the proportion
where r 0 is the critical interest rate in the absence of demand ‡uctuations, r sym is the critical interest rate with symmetric (full) information about current demand, and r asym is the critical interest rate when the information structure is asymmetric.
The denominator, r 0 r asym , in Proposition 2 measures the total fall in the critical interest rate due to demand ‡uctuations and asymmetric information.
The numerator, r sym r asym , measures the fall in this critical interest rate due to asymmetric information alone. The ratio thus gives the proportion of the total fall in this critical rate due to asymmetric information. Notice that as rises, the proportion of the fall in the critical interest rate due to asymmetric information rises. In fact, according to Proposition 2, for 1, almost all of the gap, r 0 r asym , is due to asymmetric information.
To understand this recall that there were two reasons why greater demand ‡uctuations lead to a fall in the critical interest rate r asym . First, the bene…t from cheating in high demand states today rises compared to the expected bene…ts of future cooperation, even when there is no informational asymmetry. This is the point made by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986 However, asymmetric information loses some of its power to explain cartel instability as the number of …rms in the cartel rises. Nevertheless, even when n is very large, asymmetric information always explains at least the fraction 1=(2 ) of the fall in r , according to the approximation in Proposition 2.
Note that this fraction exceeds one half for all > 0. Thus, even in extreme cases, asymmetric information explains at least half of the fall in r asym in the limit. In other words, asymmetric information always contributes signi…cantly to the e¤ect of demand ‡uctuations on cartel instability.
We next illustrate this e¤ect for the general case where a H does not approach a L : Recall from Section 2 that the a parameters can be interpreted as a H c and a L c, for the case in which marginal cost is a non-zero constant c. A useful measure of demand ‡uctuations is then (a H c)=(a L c), which we call the " ‡uctuation ratio." To get a sense of what this ‡uctuation ratio means, note that, for a demand intercept a, and marginal cost c, the markup of price over marginal cost is (a c)=2. Thus, when the ‡uctuation ratio is two, this means that, if we move from the low-demand state to the high-demand state, the monopoly markup over marginal cost doubles. Tables 2 and 3 below treat the cases of symmetric and asymmetric information, respectively, and report the critical interest rate for various values of the ‡uctuation ratio, and various values for the total number of …rms, n. We assume in these tables that the probability, , of the high demand state is = 0:50. To interpret these tables, note that, whether the interest rate is annual or semiannual, say, depends on the production period and/or seasonal demand patterns. Thus, for industries where demand has a steep seasonal pattern, due 1 2 We face one small problem in Table 3 . If the number of …rms and the ‡uctuation ratios are both large, then the non-cooperative punishment strategy derived in Section 2.2 above requires the informed …rm to produce a negative quantity when demand is low. When this happens, we solve the model again subject to the constraint that the informed …rm cannot produce negative amounts. The calculations are omitted, since they add no new insights, though they are available upon request. The critical interest rates marked with an asterisk have been calculated with this constraint binding.
to high Christmas sales, for example, then we can interpret our periods as years.
For other industries, a period might be six months or three months or whatever.
In these cases a given r from the table might re ‡ect an annual interest rate which is roughly two times larger (for six month periods) or four times larger (for three month periods) and so on. Now, the …rst rows of Tables 2 and 3 show that, in the absence of demand ‡uctuations (a H = a L ), even relatively large cartels are extremely stable. Even with 10 …rms in the industry, for example, full collusion is possible with an interest rate of 33%. Thus, the question ceases to be "how are cartels possible" and becomes, "why aren't more industries cartelized?"
The other rows of Table 2 Introducing asymmetric information, however, as in Table 3, dramatically increases cartel instability, as we would expect from Proposition 2 and Table 1 .
Thus, with a ‡uctuation ratio of 2 and symmetric information, a …ve-…rm cartel can maintain a collusive agreement with an interest rate of 35%. However, if we add asymmetric information, with the same ‡uctuation ratio, the maximum interest rate consistent with full collusion falls to 11.4%. This underscores the potential of asymmetric information to explain cartel instability. Once we move to asymmetric information, demand ‡uctuations have the potential to dramatically increase cartel instability. This happens because the temptation to cheat is greatest when demand is high, and in this situation, the cheating …rm can also lie to mislead the other …rms into thinking that demand is low.
Of course, these calculations assume very speci…c forms for the demand curves, costs, and information structure. In addition, it would be interesting to compare these ‡uctuation ratios to demand ‡uctuations in various actual markets. Finally, the demand ‡uctuations here must be understood as those which the uninformed …rms cannot predict. The unpredictable components of demand ‡uctuations will generally be smaller than the total ‡uctuations in demand. Nevertheless, even with smaller ‡uctuation ratios of 1.4 and 1.6, asymmetric information has a signi…cant potential to explain why successful cartels are not a universal phenomenon, as is clear from Tables 2 and 3. Communication, however, plays a critical role in these results. So the obvious next question is, do similar results hold when …rms do not communicate? That is, are cartels more or less stable when …rms do not communicate? To answer this question we next focus on an equilibrium with no communication.
Cartel Stability When the Informed Firm Does Not Communicate
Recall that in our game a cartel faces demand ‡uctuations and exactly one randomly chosen member of the cartel actually knows the state of demand. In Sections 2 and 3 we focused on an equilibrium trigger strategy where the informed …rm communicates the current state of demand to the uninformed …rms.
We found that cartels become less stable for two reasons. First, when demand is high, the informed …rm knows that the bene…t from cheating today is large The key di¤erence between the current equilibrium and the equilibrium derived in Section 2 is therefore the lack of communication between …rms. While colluding, an uninformed …rm produces a quantity (q U ) that depends only on expected demand, while the informed …rm produces a level of output based on actual demand. Note that, since informed …rms do not communicate, they cannot lie. This removes one source of cartel instability.
Moreover, when demand is high, the informed …rm gets to increase its own output a great deal in response to the increase in demand, even if it does not cheat, since the uninformed …rms do not increase their output in response to the high demand. This further reduces its incentive to cheat. In fact this second e¤ect turns out to imply that demand ‡uctuations no longer cause any cartel instability. Thus, when …rms do not communicate, cartels are not only as stable as when there is no asymmetric information, but they are as stable as if there are no demand ‡uctuations at all. Note that this strengthens the key message in
Gerlach (2009). Not only is communication useless, as in Gerlach's model, but
it is actually harmful to the cartel, so silence strictly increases cartel stability.
In the following subsections we derive the critical interest rate, r
at which an informed …rm is willing to fully collude in the high-demand state.
Note that this critical interest rate depends on the quantity, q U , that the typical uninformed …rm is supposed to produce in equilibrium. We also derive the critical interest rate r I L (q U ) for the informed …rm in the low-demand state, and the critical interest rate r U (q U ) for the typical uninformed …rm. We then show that all three functions, r
, and r U (q U ), actually cross at the critical interest rate r 0 from the no ‡uctuation case. This allows us to prove our key result, Proposition 3 below.
Section 4.1 below determines the current and expected future collusive payo¤s to both types of …rm. Section 4.2 determines the cheating payo¤ to the informed …rm, both when current demand is high and when it is low. We also derive the cheating pro…ts for an uninformed …rm in this section. In Section 4.3
we derive the discounted expected payo¤s from cheating and colluding for the informed and uninformed …rms. We then use these payo¤s to obtain the critical interest rate, as a function of q U ; at which each type of …rm, in each possible situation, is willing to follow the trigger strategy. This derivation leads us to 
Expected Per Period Payo¤s When Firms Collude
If the …rms collude then the informed …rm makes a production decision based on its knowledge of the state of demand, while each uninformed …rm produces q U . Thus, when current demand is high the informed …rm maximizes industry pro…ts by producing a H =2 (n 1)q U . The market price in this case is a H =2.
Thus, the payo¤ to the informed …rm given high demand is
Similarly, in the low demand case the informed …rm produces a L =2 (n 1)q U and the market price is a L =2. Thus the payo¤ to the informed …rm from colluding when demand is low is
Equations (16) and (17) imply that the expected per period payo¤ to the informed …rm from colluding is 
The uninformed colluding …rm does not know if demand is high or low.
When colluding it merely agrees to produce q U . The expected per period payo¤ to the uninformed …rm is then
Note here that …rms do not communicate as part of the collusive equilibrium.
Thus in any given period there is only a 1=n chance that a …rm knows demand, even if …rms collude. Thus, in any future period the expected collusive pro…ts
In Appendix B.1 we show that COLL N T equals COLL from Section 2.1 above.
Cheating Payo¤s
When cheating, the informed …rm maximizes current pro…ts given that the uninformed …rms continue to produce q U . When demand is high the cheating informed …rm produces
. The market price then is also equal to this quantity. Thus the cheating payo¤ to the informed …rm is
Similarly, if demand is low then the cheating payo¤ to the informed …rm will be
An uninformed …rm may cheat as well. However, since this uninformed …rm does not know the state of demand, it maximizes expected pro…ts given that demand may be high or low. Moreover, its optimizing decision is made given that the other uninformed …rms continue to produce q U ; and the one informed …rm continues to produce its collusive output. Thus a cheating uninformed …rm turns out to produce
. Its expected market price is also equal to this quantity. Thus the cheating payo¤ to the uninformed …rm is
The Trigger Strategy That Ensures Cooperation
We continue to consider an equilibrium where, if a …rm cheats in one period, then all …rms produce the non-cooperative outputs forever afterwards. In this section we calculate the rate of return from collusion for an informed …rm that knows that current demand is high. The calculations for the other cases are very similar. Proposition 3 below then yields a formula for r N T , the maximum interest rate consistent with a credible trigger strategy that maintains full collusion in the absence of communication.
First, in the punishment phase both types of …rm revert to the asymmetric information Cournot equilibrium. Thus the payo¤s in the punishment phase are the same as the payo¤s presented in Section 2.2.
Next, an informed …rm's expected discounted payo¤ from colluding, given that it knows that current demand is high, is
where COLL;I H;N T ,and
are de…ned in equations (16) and (20) respectively.
The expected present and future payo¤s to a cheating informed …rm is
where CH;I H;N T and N C are de…ned in equations (21) and (7) respectively. The informed …rm will then cooperate only if 
That is, the informed …rm's incentive to cheat is independent of whether current demand is high or low. We use these derivations to prove Proposition 3.
Proposition 3
Given asymmetric information about current demand, when …rms do not communicate, the maximum interest rate consistent with a credible trigger strategy is r N T = r 0 = 4n (n+1) 2 :
Proof. In Appendix B.1 we …rst prove that r
13 Thus, we represent both functions by r
. Now, the informed …rm will cheat for interest rates higher than r I (q U ), but is willing to collude for lower interest rates. Similarly, the uninformed …rms will cheat for any interest rate higher than r U (q U ), but is willing to collude for lower rates. This means that if the market interest rate is above r U (q U ) but below r I (q U ) then the uniformed …rm will cheat and the collusion will fail. Similarly if the market interest rate is above r I (q U ) but below r U (q U ) then the informed …rm will cheat and collusion will fail. Thus, the function r(q U ) = min(r I (q U ); r U (q U )) gives the maximum interest rates for which both uninformed and informed …rms will collude, as a function of q U . In other words, …rms in the cartel are willing to collude if and only if the market interest rate lies below r(q U ): Now Appendix B.1 proves that r I (q U ) decreases as q U increases, and Appendix B.2 shows that r U (q U ) increases as q U increases. Thus, the maximum market interest rate at which full collusion is stable, r N T , must be where
In Appendix B.3 we show that r
. Thus, the maximum value of r N T for which all …rms in the cartel will collude is determined by setting
This substitution gives us r N T = r 0 = 4n (n+1) 2 . Intuitively, part of the reason cartels with asymmetric information and communication are unstable is because the informed …rm has an incentive to lie about the state of demand to the other, uninformed …rms. However, if …rms do not communicate they cannot lie, which increases cartel stability. Of course, the informed …rm's incentive to cheat is also usually higher in the high demand state. However, if …rms do not communicate then the informed …rm will, under the collusive agreement, produce much more in the high demand state, while the uninformed …rms produce a constant quantity based on average demand.
As a consequence, the informed …rm is able to counter its increased incentive to cheat by producing more when demand is high. Thus, even when demand is high, the informed …rm's increased incentive to cheat is exactly countered by an increased reward from collusion. These two opposing e¤ects therefore lead to a critical interest rate that is the same as when a H = a L , i.e., the same as when there are no demand ‡uctuations at all.
14 Thus, demand ‡uctuations have no impact on cartel stability when …rms do not communicate. 15 The results for this model are stronger than those for the model in Gerlach low-demand signals. This is because deception followed by undercutting repre- 1 4 On the other hand, when demand is low, the informed …rm's reduced incentive to cheat is countered by a reduction in its output, which is why r I H (q U ) = r I L (q U ) in equation (27) . 1 5 Note, however, that this depends on (n 1)q U a L =2, so that, in the low demand state, output of uninformed …rms does not exceed the optimal collusive output.
sents an easy-to-detect o¤-schedule deviation. 
Conclusion
In this paper we show that asymmetric information decreases cartel stability when …rms communicate, but may actually increase cartel stability when they Of course several caveats to our argument are in order. First, our model is very simple. We assume very simple functional forms, and a very simple information structure. It may be useful, for example, to compare our model's information structure to the information structure in Green and Porter (1984) .
Second, the punishment strategy we assume is also very simple. If one allowed for optimal punishment strategies (see Abreu, 1986 and Abreu, et al., 1986) , then cartels would presumably be more stable. The issue of asymmetric punishments (Segerstrom, 1985 ) also needs to be considered. Third, iid demand shocks might drive some of our results. If current strong demand implies stronger demand in the next period (Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991) then the informed …rm's willingness to lie and cheat may be o¤set by higher collusive pro…ts tomorrow.
Finally, it is especially important to develop models where …rms must com-municate in order to coordinate e¢ ciently. For example, if …rms have upward sloping marginal cost curves, then optimal collusion will require informed and uninformed …rms to all produce similar quantities. This would require communication, which would reduce the cartel's stability. Similarly, if more than one …rm is informed then our paper suggests that cartels might be more unstable if these informed …rms need to communicate to determine who knows what. 16 Investigating di¤erent information structures such as this would be an important avenue for future research. 1 6 It should also be noted that, if more than one …rm is informed, then the informed …rms can potentially be played o¤ against each other, as shown, e.g., by Ben-Porath and Kahnemann (1996) . However, Ben-Porath and Kahneman prove a folk theorem in this context. It would therefore be interesting to see how e¤ective their mechanism is if the discount factor is bounded away from one.
A Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The rate of return from cooperation given the high-deman state, r asym , is given in (13 
Notice that A is merely the expected intercept of the demand curve. From equation (7), N C depends on N C;U and N C;I : To …nd N C;U , substitute (2), (3) and (4) into (5) to get N C;U = A n + 1 (n + 1)a H (n 1)A 2(n + 1)
After considerable simpli…cation this becomes
Next, to get N C;I , substitute equations (3) and (4) 
After simpli…cation this becomes
Combining (A3) and (A5) in (7) we get
Combining (1) and (A6) we get
This gives the numerator of equation (13).
Now we turn to the denominator of equation (13), where we subtract a 2 H =4n from the cheating pro…ts in (9) . This gives
Finally, substituting (A7) and (A8) into (13) gives
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2 we need to …rst …nd r sym and r 0 : To …nd r sym we need to compare the expected payo¤ from cheating with the expected payo¤ from colluding under symmetric information.
When information about demand is symmetric the cheating pro…t in the high demand state is
There is no di¤erence between monopoly pro…ts for the symmetric information and the asymmetric information cases. However, the (noncooperative) pro…t in the punishment phase when demand is high is
Thus, using (A11) and (A12), expected punishment pro…ts for each …rm when information is symmetric is
Using these results, the return to collusion is
Substituting (1), (A10), and (A13) into (A14) yields
Then, plugging a H = (1 + ")a L into (A15) and taking the …rst order linear approximation of r sym around " = 0 gives
Similarly, plugging a H = (1 + ")a L into (14) and taking the …rst order linear approximation of r asym around " = 0 gives
Also when there is no demand ‡uctuation, and therefore no scope for informational asymmetry in our model, the return to cooperation becomes (setting
Now the approximate proportion of the fall in the return to cooperation due to asymmetric information is When demand is high current collusive pro…t to the informed …rm is given by equation (16) and cheating pro…t to the informed …rm is given by equation (21) . Substituting these values into the denominator in (26) Note that the terms involving a H cancel, so the right hand side of (B2) does not depend on a H . Similarly, when demand is low, the current collusive pro…t to the informed …rm is given by equation (17) and cheating pro…t to the informed …rm is given by equation (22) . Substituting these values into the denominator of (B1) gives us the same result as (B2) since
Thus, both the numerator and the denominator of (26) are identical to those of (B1). In other words, r 
Next, a …rm's expected collusive pro…ts do not depend on communication.
Overall expected collusive pro…ts for the cartel as a whole are a 
Plugging this in (B4) gives
Notice that q U only appears in the denominator of (B6). The numerator of (B6) is positive and the denominator rises as q U rises. Therefore r I (q U )
decreases as q U rises:
B.2 Proof that r U (q U ) is increasing in q U Equation (19) gives the current expected collusive pro…t to an uninformed …rm and equation (23) gives the expected cheating pro…t to an uninformed …rm. 
gives us r U (q U ):
Notice that once again the numerator of (B7) is the same as that for (B4) and is independent of q U : The denominator however, upon subsituting (19) and (23), simpli…es to
Now, q U will never be greater than A 2 , since the quantity produced by the uninformed …rms, alone, would then already exceed the industry pro…t maximizing amount when demand is low, since A > a L . Thus for all relevant values of q U , the expression 1 16 A 2q U 2 decreases as q U increases. The denominator of (A26) therefore falls as q U rises for all relevant values of q U . The numerator of (A26), however, is identical to the numerator for (A23) which, recall, is independent of q U : Thus, the numerator of (A26) is also independent of q U :
Therefore, since its denominator is decreasing in q U , r U (q U ), is increasing in We derived r I (q U ) in section A.3.1 12 and r U (q U ) in section A.3.2. We also noted, in section A.3.2 that the expressions for r I (q U ) and r U (q U ) as shown in (B4) and (B7) respectively di¤ered only in the denominator and that the numerator was independent of q U . Thus, setting the denominators of (B4) and (B7) equal to each other will give us the values for which r I (q U ) = r U (q U ):
We therefore solve for q U by setting 1 2 Recall, that in Section A.3.1. we showed that r I (q U ) = r I H (q U ) = r I L (q U ):
After taking the square root on both sides of (B8) we get
We showed above that q U < A 2 , so A 2q U > 0 . In this situation the negative root would then give a negative value for q U ; which is absurd. Thus we can ignore the negative root. Solving for q U then gives
Thus, r I (q U ) = r U (q U ) when q U = 
